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INTRODUCTION

Sex offender registration and community notification laws
constitute a remarkable political success story. While only a handful of
states had registration laws of any kind as of the late 1980s, and none
had community notification laws, by the end of 1990s both registration
and notification laws, focusing almost exclusively on convicted sex
offenders, were in effect nationwide. To students of the field, the
laws-often enacted unanimously and without meaningful debateserve as object lessons in legislative panic. Unlike earlier panics,
however, including those relative to sex offenders, the panic has not
dissipated.' Indeed, registration and community notification laws have
endured and been significantly expanded upon during the past decade,
despite research findings casting considerable doubt on their utility and
public safety efficacy.2
This Article examines how and why the laws persist in the face of
t Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,
Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Laura Atcheson (J.D. 2011) for her
research assistance.
1. See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text (discussing "sexual psychopath"
laws taking root in 1930s but subsequently disavowed).
2. See infra notes 211-239 and accompanying text (summarizing research findings).
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these obstacles. Part I provides an overview of the genesis and
evolution of registration and community notification laws. Part II
situates the laws' saga in the broader literature concerning modem
criminal justice politics, dominated by tough-on-criminal offender
initiatives. Registration and notification, however, provide a prime
opportunity to illuminate the related yet distinct phenomenon of how
one such initiative, despite its questionable benefit, has been inured to
legislative reconsideration. 3 Part III explores several chief reasons
behind this stasis, drawing parallels to the political science literature on
path dependence and lock-in. The Article concludes with some thoughts
on the broader implications of the laws' staying power.
I. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

A. Origins
The main animating impulse behind modem-day sex offender
registration and community notification laws is ancient and eminently
understandable. Individuals have always felt a potent need to know of
potentially dangerous persons in their midst.4 As populations increased
in size and became ever-more transitory, as a result of technological
advances in transportation options, apprehension over anonymity
intensified. 5 In response, govemments in eighteenth and nineteenth
century Europe, no longer able to single out the criminally convicted by
means of physical disfigurement, began collecting, organizing, and
storing information on convicts.6 Bertillonism, a complex system
entailing recorded physical measurements of individuals and their
conviction histories, popular at the turn of the twentieth century, marked
perhaps the zenith of the urge. 7
In the United States, Bertillonism, as well as "rogues galleries," in
which early photographic techniques were deployed to array convicts'
photos in police stations, enjoyed popularity for a time. 8 Fingerprinting

3.

See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REv. 813,

827 (1998) (discussing posited superior institutional responsiveness of legislatures based on
access to expert opinion and fact-finding).
4. For a fuller discussion of the historical antecedents of and motivating forces behind
registration and community notification laws, see WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS
POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS N AMERICA 1-19

(Stanford Univ. Press 2009).
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 2-5.
7. Id. at 9-12.
8. Id. at 10-11, 19.
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came to enjoy even wider use. 9 In the early 1930s, however, authorities
in the Los Angeles County, California area, concerned about the
infusion of "gangsters" from east coast and Midwestern cities, began
pushing for provisions requiring that persons convicted of specified
crimes register.10 The idea, which bore the unmistakable imprint of
antecedent European efforts, had the added advantage of requiring that
ex-convicts make affirmative effort to register, unlike the passive
collection methods previously used. 1" Over the next fifty years,
registration laws were enacted in dozens of localities nationwide, and
even several states, targeting a wide variety of persons convicted of
crimes (including miscegenation).1 2 By the mid-1980s, however, amid
persistent criticisms over the quality and comprehensiveness of
information contained in registries, as well as its perceived lack of
public safety utility, interest in registration flagged, and the laws for all
practical purposes existed in name only. 13
At the end of the 1980s, however, this disinterest experienced a
radical reversal, as several widely reported child victimizations, in
Washington State and Minnesota in particular, triggered resurgent
interest in registration. 14 States, not localities, were now the prime
movers behind the laws, which unlike predecessor provisions, typically
targeted sex offenders and a cluster of crimes thought related to sexual
victimization (e.g., kidnapping). 15 Washington's Community Protection
Act of 1990, motivated by fear of especially high risk of sex offender
recidivism, contained a registration provision, yet also inaugurated a
new complementary social control strategy: community notification,
which disseminated registrants' (referred to as "sexual predators")16
background and identifying information to the public at-large.
According to the Washington Legislature:
Persons found to have committed a sex offense have a reduced
expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety
and in the effective operation of government. Release of information
about sexual predators to public agencies and under limited
circumstances, the general public, will further the governmental
interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal and
9. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 13.

10. Id. at 22-28.
11.

Id.

12. Id. at 12-19.
13. Id. at 46-47.
14. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 49-55.

15. Id. at 66-69.
16. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.44.130, 9A.144.030, 9.94A.030 (West 1990).
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mental health systems ....17

Washington's law was hugely significant. It drew the nation's
attention to registration, and public sentiment and policy quickly
awakened to the perceived benefits of empowering police with readily
accessible information on criminally risky individuals.
With
community notification, moreover, such information was not to be
monopolized by police but rather was to be actively provided to
communities. At the same time, Washington's law underscored the
political power of an outraged community, galvanized by the belief that
crucial information was being withheld by government officials,
information that could be used to defend against recidivist sex
offenders.
Similar outrage soon spawned laws elsewhere but none had the
impact of the July 1994 rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan
Kanka in Hamilton Township, New Jersey by Jesse Timmendequas, a
twice-convicted sex offender who lived nearby.' 8 While local police
were aware of Timmendequas's history, his neighbors reportedly were
not.' 9 Voicing a sentiment that would come to define modem
registration and notification laws, Megan's mother, Maureen Kanka,
asserted that "if [she and her family] had known there
was a pedophile
20
living on our street, [Megan] would be alive today.",
In the wake of a rapid-fire successful signature petition, the
Speaker of the Assembly Garabed "Chuck" Haytaian, running for the
U.S. Senate, declared a legislative emergency, bypassing customary
committee debate and forcing sex offender registration and community
2
notification proposals to move directly to the floor for consideration. '
After winning unanimous support in both the state houses, on October
31, 1994, three months and two days after Megan Kanka was murdered,
Governor Christine Todd Whitman (with Maureen Kanka at her side)
signed Megan's Law.22 With its passage, New Jersey became the fifth
state to allow for some form of community notification. 23
17. Id.§ 71.05.670.
18. Michelle Ruess, A Mother's Plea: Pass Megan's Bill - Panel OKS Compromise,
RECORD (N.J.), Sept. 27, 1994, at Al.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Michelle Ruess, Megan 's Law Moving Fast in Assembly - Crackdown on Sex
Offenders, RECORD (N.J.), Aug. 16, 1994, at Al.
22. Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at BI.

23. PETER FINN, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., SEX OFFENDER COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION 3-4
(Feb. 1997), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/162364.pdf (noting Alaska, Louisiana, New
Jersey, Tennessee and Washington).
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The state-level developments did not escape the attention of
Congress. Indeed, the October 1989 disappearance of Jacob Wetterling
in Minnesota prompted U.S. Senator David Durenberger (R-MN), in
May 1991 to push for adoption of the "Crimes Against Children
Registration Act.",24 As Durenberger told his Senate colleagues:
The reasons for enacting this legislation on the national level are clear:
sexual crimes against children are widespread; the people who commit
these offenses repeat their crimes again and again; and local law
enforcement officials need access to an interstate system of
information to prevent and respond to these horrible crimes against
children. 25
Even though there was no evidence that Jacob had been sexually abused
(the case remains unsolved), Durenberger stressed that if law
enforcement "had been aware of the presence of any convicted sex
offenders in the community, it would have been of invaluable assistance
during those first critical hours of investigation." 26 Ultimately,
however, despite the backing of the Wetterling Foundation, and
bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, registration failed to gain
Senate approval after conference. 27
Undaunted, Durenberger continued his push for legislation. In
November 1993, the campaign was advanced in the House by
Representative Jim Ramstad (R-MN), who, along with many
colleagues, emphasized the need for a registration law in light of the
purported high recidivism risk of sex offenders. 28 Again, registration
was touted by Ramstad and others for its capacity to provide law
enforcement with access to information on convicted offenders in the
immediate wake of a child being abducted or otherwise harmed.2 9
Registration was also lauded for its perceived value as a deterrent to

24. Jacob's Parents Urge Supportfor Abuser Bill, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
May 26, 1991, at B7.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 140 CONG. REC. S2825-26 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger) (recounting legislative history).
28. See 139 CONG. REc. H10319-22 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) ("We know that child sex offenders are repeat offenders .... Child sex offenders
repeat their crimes again and again and again to the point of compulsion."); id. at H10322
(statement of Rep. Grams) ("Studies have shown that child sex offenders are some of the
most notorious repeat offenders ... this bill gives society the right to know where these
convicted offenders reside.").
29. See id. at H10320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); id at H10321 (statement of
Rep. Ramstad).

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 61:371

criminal activity. 30 According to Ramstad, registration would put an
individual "on notice that when subsequent sexual crimes are committed
in the area where he lives, he may well be subject to investigation. This
may well31have a prophylactic effect, deterring him from future sexual
crimes."
Although twenty-four states at the time had registration laws, a
federal "stick ' 32 was needed "to prod all States to enact similar laws and
to provide for a national registration system to handle offenders who
move from one State to another., 33 Federal law would do so by
threatening to withhold crime-fighting funds from states
that failed to
34
Congress.
by
prescribed
requirements
adopt registration
In its original incarnations, starting in 1991, what was to become
the Jacob Wetterling Act, treated registrants' information as "private
data," available only to law enforcement for investigative purposes and
government agencies for confidential background checks on persons
working with children.3 5 As history would have it, however, the
victimization of Megan Kanka occurred while the bill progressed
through the legislative process, prompting a sea-change in the
chambers. Representative Jennifer Dunn (R-WA) rose to speak in the
House "with a deep sense of outrage" over the omission of a
notification provision intoning that:
Seven-year-old Megan Kanka of New Jersey is dead, Mr. Speaker.
Sexual predators were released into her community and they lured that
precious little girl to a grisly death. Conferees who worked to protect
the rights of sexual predators should understand this: The next little
girl killed by a released predator will haunt them. Mr. Speaker, it is
outrageous that a few conferees have supplanted their will for the will
of the House. It is outrageous that this bill effectively denies
notification to the next Megan Kanka ...or to your mother or sister or
daughter. And it is outrageous that we would place the rights of
criminals over the rights of victims. 36
Representative Dick Zimmer (R-NJ) made the absence of
notification a key rallying point, and Chris Smith (R-NJ), representing
the township in which Megan Kanka lived, condemned the "arrogance"

30. Id. at H10321 (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
31. 139 CONG. REc. H10321,

32. Id. at H 10320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
33. Id. at H10321 (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
34. Id. at H 10320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
35.

137 CONG. REc. S6704 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger);

139 CONG. REc. H10320 (statement of Rep. Schumer).
36. 140 CONG. REC. H7939-40 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Rep. Dunn).
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of the conferees and demanded that notification be permitted. 37 Smith
stated "[n]o one in the community knew the killer's sordid past, Mr.
Speaker. Had Megan's grieving parents known that their neighbor was
a dangerous person, they would have taken steps to protect their
precious child. Megan's parents had a right to know. 38 The redoubled
effort to include a notification provision soon proved a success, and
President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law (with Maureen
Kanka at his side) 39 as part of the massive $30 billion Omnibus
Anticrime Crime Bill on September 13, 1994.40

The resulting law, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act ("Wetterling"),
required states to adopt its provisions if they wished to avoid losing ten
percent of their Byrne Formula Grant Program criminal justice funds,
the main general federal funding source for state criminal justice
programs.41 States had to do so within three years of the law's
enactment, subject to a two-year extension for states making "good faith
efforts," and any undistributed funds resulting from a state's failure to
comply were to be reallocated to compliant states.42
In its final form, Wetterling required registration of persons
"convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor ' ' 43 or
"a sexually violent offense," 44 as well as persons designated by the
sentencing court as a "sexually violent predator. 4 5 Registration was
required upon release from prison or when placed on probation, parole,
or supervised release after the Act's implementation, with ten days to
comply. 46 Sexually violent predators were subject to lifetime
registration and were required to verify their residential addresses every
ninety days; the other two categories of registrants had to register for
ten years and annually verify their addresses.47 Individuals who
knowingly violated the law were "subject to criminal penalties in any

37. Id. at H7950 (statement of Rep. Smith).
38. Id.
39. Jennifer Bucksbaum, NJ Victims' Parents See Crime Bill Signed, RECORD (N.J.),
Sept. 14, 1994, at A17.
40. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A) (1994).
42. Id. § 14071(g).
43. Id. § 14071(a)(1)(A).
44. Id.

45. Id. § 14071(a)(1)(B).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(1).
47. Id. § 14071(b)(1), (3), (6).
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State" in which the violation occurred.4 8
Congress elected to make community notification permissive, not
mandatory. 49 Wetterling specified that law enforcement "may release

relevant information that is necessary to protect the public" regarding a
registrant, and provided officials immunity from civil liability for
actions taken in "good faith" pursuant to the law. 50
Wetterling further provided that the Attorney General was to issue

implementing guidelines, and in April 1996, final guidelines were
released, 51 emphasizing that federal law specified only minimum
requirements for states (constituting "a floor ... not a ceiling").52 The

states enjoyed similar latitude with respect to community notification,
enjoying specific authorization to engage in either "particularized
determinations"
of risk or "categorical judgments" based on nature of
53
conviction.

Not long thereafter, Representative Zimmer introduced what was
to become the federal Megan's Law, H.R. 2137, mandating that states

utilize community notification, again under threat of losing federal
funds.54 Prompted by concern that states were "reluctant" to release

information on registrants,55 and that a lack of community notification
in some twenty states might leave communities vulnerable and
encourage sex offenders to migrate in search of anonymity, 56 the bill
won unanimous support in both Houses of Congress. 5

President Clinton signed the bill into

In May 1996,

law. 58

With Megan's Law, the federal government did not merely permit
community notification. Rather, states were instructed that they "shall

48. Id. § 14071(c).
49. Id. §14071(b).
50. Id. § 14071(d)-(e).
51. Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,110 (Apr. 4, 1996).
52. Id. at 15,112.
53. Id. at 15,116.
54. See H. Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 104-555, at 2 (1996) ("It has been
brought to the attention of the Committee . . . that notwithstanding the clear intent of
Congress that relevant information about these offenders be released to the public ... some
law enforcement agencies are still reluctant to do so."). See also 142 CONG. REC. H4452
(daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
55. See 142 CONG. REC. H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
McCollum).
56. Hearing on H.R. 2137 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 99-100 (2d Sess. 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
57. See LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT, AND POPULISM 179-80 (1998).
58. Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1345,
1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994)).
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release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public
concerning a specific person required to register." 59 "Information must
be released to members of' 6the
public as necessary to protect the public
0
from registered offenders."
Since the enactment of Megan's Law, the federal government has
imposed an ongoing series of registration and notification requirements,
backed by federal funding threats. In October 1996, less than five
months after Megan's Law was enacted, came the Pam Lynchner
Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996,61 named after
a Houston real estate agent who was sexually assaulted by a twiceconvicted felon.6 2 Lynchner expanded the lifetime registration
requirement beyond designated sexually violent predators to also
include offenders (1) twice convicted of committing a criminal offense
against a minor, (2) twice convicted of committing63a sexually violent
offense, or (3) convicted of aggravated sexual abuse.

Over the next decade came other laws, each modifying or in some
way broadening registration and notification: in 1997,64 1998 (two
laws), 65 2000,66 2003,67 and 2005.68 The most significant change to
date, however, came in 2006, when by voice votes in both the House
and Senate, and with more than three dozen cosponsors, Congress

adopted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
(AWA). 69 The bill was signed by President Bush on July 27, 2006,

twenty-five years to the day after six-year-old Adam Walsh disappeared

59. 42 U.S.C. §14071(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
60. Final Guidelines for Megan's Law and the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,009, 39,019 (July
21, 1997).
61. Pub. L. No. 104-236, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 3093, 3093 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 14072 (2006)).
62.

Alan D. Scholle, Sex Offender Registration, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN,

July 2000, at 17.
63. 42 U.S.C. §14072(d)(2) (2006).
64. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders
Registration Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 115, 111 Stat. 2440, 246171.

65. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2461 (1998); An Act, Pub. L. No. 105277, § 123, 112 Stat. 2681-72, 73 (1998).
66. Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1537-38
(2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2006) and 42 U.S.C. § 140710) (2006)).
67. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
68. 151 CONG. REc. S3731 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Dorgan)
(directing the attorney general to make available a national registry via the Internet).
69. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006)).
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from a Florida shopping mall.7 °
While named after Adam Walsh and enacted in recognition of the
advocacy work of his parents John and Reve Walsh (the former became
host of the popular television show "America's Most Wanted"),7 1 the
AWA formally established the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka,
and Pam Lynchner Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Program. 72 The AWA substantially overhauled federal registration and
notification policy, expressly repealing Wetterling, Megan's Law, and

Lynchner.73 It seeks, in the words of Congress, to establish a
"comprehensive national system for the registration of [sex offenders
and offenders against children].
Like Megan's Law in 1996, 75 the AWA was motivated by concern
over the diversity of state regimes, which advocates asserted created

"loopholes" and "deficiencies," allowing thousands of registrants to
become "lost." 76 The AWA heightened requirements across the board,

including the range of registerable offenses. All persons convicted of a

"sex offense" were required to register, a category encompassing

several expansive subcategories,

77

including criminal offenses having

"an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another," 78

"[v]ideo voyeurism"; the possession, production, or distribution of child
pornography and;79 "[a]ny conduct that by its nature is a sex offense
against a minor.",

The AWA also contains several significant policy changes,
including a requirement that specified juvenile offenders register and
requiring that registrants verify information in person (as opposed to
mailing in verification). 80 Moreover, individuals now must register,
keep their registration current, and provide a new photo, in each place

70. Id.
71. Id.§2.
72. 42 U.S.C. §16902 (2006).
73. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, 600-01.
74. 42 U.S.C. §16901 ("Declaration of Purpose").
75. In addition to the references above, see, for example, 142 CONG. REc. H4453
(daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer), urging adoption of the Megan's Law
"so that all 50 states [would] be held to a common standard of community notification."
76. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-218, pt. 1, at 23-24 (2005); 151 CONG. REc. H7889
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Green); 152 CONG. REc. S8018 (daily ed. Jul.
20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Allen); id. at S8022 (statement of Sen. DeWine); id. at S8030
(statement of Sen. Frist).
77. 42 U.S.C. §16911(5) (2006).
78. Id. §16911(5)(A)(i).
79. Id. § 16911(7)(F)-(I).
80. See id.§§ 16911(8), 16913(c).
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they live, go to school, and work.81 When they register, far more
information is to be collected for inclusion in state registries, including
social security number, employment and school location information,
finger and palm prints, a DNA sample, and vehicle license plate number
and description. 82 Finally, if they intend to leave their jurisdiction of
residence for seven days or more, registrants must inform their home
jurisdiction as well as the jurisdiction they intend to visit. 83
84
The centerpiece of the AWA is its tier classification system.
Whereas in the past federal law left to states how individuals were to be
distinguished for purposes of registration and community notification,
the AWA specifies that a conviction-based regime must be employed.85
Unlike risk-based tier systems, such as employed in Washington State
and New Jersey, the AWA expressly eschews individualized risk
assessments. 86 All statutorily eligible registrants must register, and no
basis exists to challenge the registration requirement for the specified
duration, which varies from a minimum period of fifteen years (and
annual verification) to life-long (and quarterly verification).8 7
Under the AWA, all registrants are automatically subject to
community notification by means of internet websites that states are
required to create and maintain 88 and registrants' information is made
available for public view on the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender
Public Website maintained by the attorney general.8 9 Information must
also be provided to community entities such as schools, public housing
agencies, and child social service organizations. 90 The AWA also adds
new and harsher penalties for registration violations, for the first time
specifying a minimum penalty that states must impose-a term of
imprisonment in excess of one year. 91
As with prior federal demands, Congress afforded states a period
of time to comply with new federal mandates. The AWA specified that
jurisdictions had until July 27, 2009 to comply and thus avoid losing ten
percent of Byrne Grant funds. 92 Although the deadline has been
81. Id. §§ 16913(a), 16914(b)(4).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 16914(a)-(b).

83. Id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. § 16911.
Id. § 16912.
Seeid § 16911(1)-(4).
42 U.S.C. § 16915(a).
Id. § 16918(a).
Id.§ 16920.
Id. § 16921(b)

91. Id. § 16913(e).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16924(a), 16925(a).
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extended on several occasions, as of this writing only six jurisdictions
(four states and two tribes) have achieved "substantial compliance,"
according to the Department of Justice. 93 State resistance has, in the
main, been based on state government estimates indicating that the costs
associated with compliance far outweighed the threatened loss in Byrne
Grant funds and, in some instances, principled
policy objections (for
94
instance, over registration of juveniles).
If past experience can serve as a guide, however, federal pressure
will ultimately prove effective in satisfying congressional will. With
financial pressure imposed by Wetterling in 1994, all states had
registration laws by 1996. 95 Likewise, nationwide compliance with the
community notification requirement contained in Megan's Law in 1996
was achieved in 1999.96
B. Evolution

If AWA compliance occurs, state laws will become broader and
more onerous in numerous respects, including the scope of offenses
covered; duration of registration; frequency and methods that
registration and updates must occur (in person); and extent of registrants
subject to community notification (based on conviction, not individual
risk). In addition, Indian tribes and semi-sovereign governments within
the federal orbit will, for the first time, be expected to create and
maintain registries and make registrants' information available to the
public. 97 As a result, tribal registries will augment those already
existing in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the territories of
American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. 98
While hugely significant, federal directives have never had
definitive effect, however. Indeed, as registration itself originated in
93. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Justice Department Announces Sixth
Jurisdiction to Implement Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (Sept. 10, 2010),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov.newsroom/pressreleases/2010/SMART10120.htm
(citing
Delaware, Florida, Ohio, South Dakota, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, and Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation).
94. See Andrew J. Harris et al., Widening the Net: The Effects of Transitioningto the
Adam Walsh Act's FederallyMandated Sex Offender ClassificationSystem, 37 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 503, 504-06 (2010); Wayne A. Logan, CriminalJustice Federalism and National

Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 91-94 (2008).
95. Doris Sue Wong, Weld Signs Bill Creating Sex-Offender Registry-Those
Convicted Have to Register, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1996, at B2.
96. Roundhouse Roundup (Legislature),ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 13, 1999, at D5.

97. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(10) (1996).
98. Id.
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municipalities in the early 1930s, and later was embraced by the states
(albeit sporadically), the federal government remained uninvolved until
99
1994, with the Wetterling Act-when thirty-eight states had laws.
Moreover, community notification originated in the state of Washington
in 1990 and was thrust onto the national stage as a result of New
Jersey's Megan's Law, enacted in 1994. 100
Because federal law has prescribed only minima, states adopted
independent policies and criteria. While states as a rule have required
that persons convicted of serious sexual and child-victim offenses
register, and registries are dominated by such registrants, it is also the
case that registration criteria have been expansive.101 Since the early
1990s, states have at various times specified such offenses as adult
prostitution involving solicitation of sodomy (Louisiana); posting an
obscene bumper sticker or writing (Alabama); adultery, if one of the
parties is under eighteen years of age; public urination (numerous
10 2
states); and peeping (South Carolina) as warranting registration.
"Romeo and Juliet" sexual encounters 1between
juveniles have also been
03
the frequent target of state registration.
State registration laws have also often extended beyond the gamut
of offenses specified by legislatures. Several states, concerned that
offenders will plead to non-registerable offenses, have criteria that
permit courts to exercise judgment on registration. Kansas, for instance,
allows registration if a conviction is based on a "sexually motivated"
crime, 10 4 which one court used to require registration of an offender
who pled guilty to burglary and misdemeanor theft in relation to his

99. James Popkin et al., Natural Born Predators,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 19,

1994, at 64.
100. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 49-55.
101. By way of example, as of late November 2003, of the over 18,000 registrants in
Illinois, seventy-eight percent were convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault. Sex Offender Registration in
Illinois, ILLINOIS STATE POLICE 5 (2003) (on file with author).

102. See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 257, 281-82 (2005).
103.

See, e.g., Roberto Suro, Town Faults Law, Not Boy in Sex Case, WASH. POST,

May 11, 1997, at Al (discussing the case of an 18-year-old Wisconsin boy forced to register
as a result of having consensual sex with his 15-year-old girlfriend). For a discussion of
statutory rape as a basis for registration, including the twenty-eight jurisdictions allowing
registration to stem from strict liability-based convictions, see Catherine L. Carpenter, The
Constitutionalityof Strict Liability in Sex Offender RegistrationLaws, 86 B.U. L. REv. 295,

309-25 (2006).
104. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(16) (2009) (defined as meaning that "one of the
purposes for which the defendant committed the crime was for the purpose of the
defendant's sexual gratification.").
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taking several items of female underwear.' 05 Other state laws contain
similar provisions, requiring registration when an offense is committed
16
"for the purpose of sexual gratification" (California and Washington)
or "vicarious sexual gratification" (Indiana). 10 7 In Minnesota,
registration is warranted if a conviction "aris[es] out of the same set of
circumstances" as a charged
offense that statutory law specifies as
08
requiring registration. 1
Expansiveness has manifested in several other ways as well. For
instance, the predisposition is seen in the increasing tendency of state
laws to focus on inchoate offenses (attempts, conspiracies, solicitations,
and instances of aiding or abetting). Also, while all states regard lawful
convictions as a basis for registration, they also (unlike past registration
criteria) usually include other dispositions, requiring registration of
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, found guilty but
mentally ill, or when subject to state involuntary civil commitment
provisions.
In sum, registration and notification laws have proved highly
attractive to political bodies. Congress, for its part, since 1994 has
regarded registration and notification as the equivalent of legislative
catnip, perennially (often in tandem with election cycles) revising
federal expectations. In states, registration and notification laws have
been quickly and often unanimously adopted, and laws have been
regularly revisited and expanded. 0 9 Experience in Illinois is a case in
point. 11° At its origin in 1986, before the 1990s political resurgence,
only four sexual offenses triggered registration, itself required only after
conviction of a second or subsequent offense. 11 In 1995, however, in
the wake of the kidnapping and murder of a six-year-old girl, the
legislature unanimously amended Illinois law without debate to require
registration after a first offense and target all sex offenders, not merely
105. See State v. Patterson, 963 P.2d 436, 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding
registration requirement). The court noted that it had "some concern over the possibility
that this statute could be extended beyond reason. For instance, would a defendant fall
under the provisions of the [Act] if he or she stole contraceptives or engaged in disorderly
conduct by shouting sexually explicit words?" Id.
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.006 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130,
9.94A.030(43) (West 2010).
107. IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-4.5(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2010).
108. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166(lb)(a)(l) (West 2010).
109.

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US

48-49 (Sept. 2007) (noting enactments in Florida, Illinois, Virginia, and Washington).
110. See Michelle Olson, Note, Putting the Brakes on the Preventive State:
ChallengingResidency Restrictions on Child Sex Offenders in Illinois Under the Ex Post
Facto Clause, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 403 (2010).
11. Id. at410.
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those victimizing children, to register."12 Today, registration is tied to
thirty different crimes, registrants must provide far more information
than in the past, and they face felony punishment if convicted of a
3 Notification charted a similar political course.
registration violation. 11
Enacted in relatively conservative form in 1995, permitting but not
requiring notification and focusing only on child sex offenders, in 1997
all Illinois sex offenders were targeted, and in 1999 notification was
made mandatory (via the Internet). 114
There have, however, been a few instances of retrenchment worthy
of mention. In March 1995, for instance, a bill proposed in Montana to
expand eligibility to include adult consensual sodomy was derailed." 15
Protesters compared the proposal to the Nazi practice of registering
homosexuals and the governor received a flurry of negative calls,
including from tourists who threatened to boycott the state if the bill
passed."16 In 1996, a similar effort in Kansas was defeated.' 17
Likewise, in 1994, California, in conjunction with its decision to
permit community notification and public access, removed several8
misdemeanor offenses from its list of registration-eligible offenses."
Later, in 1997, the state rescinded its consensual sodomy registration
requirement and allowed persons with prior convictions to be removed
9 More recently, as noted above, several states have
from the registry. 11
backed away from registration requirements for "Romeo and Juliet"
convictions involving minors who engaged in consensual underage
sex. 120
Viewed in the broader recent history, however, such limits have
been aberrations. For evidence of this one need only consider the
growth in registry rolls. From April 1998 to February 2001, the number
112. Id. at411.

113. Id. at 411-12.
114. Id. at412-13.
115. Furor in Montana: Anti-Gay Section of Sex-Offender Bill Cut, ATLANTA
CONSTITUTION, Mar. 24, 1995, at A14.

116. Id.
117.

Peter Freiberg, Megan's Laws' Bode Ill for Some Gay People, WASH. BLADE,

Apr. 4, 1997, at 17, 21. Congress, meanwhile, resisted an effort in 1997 to prevent adult
consensual sodomy from being a registerable offense. See H.R. REP. No. 105-256, at 41-42
(1997).
118. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 1999) (historical and statutory notes).
119. Robert L. Jacobson, Note, "Megan's Laws" Reinforcing Old Patterns of AntiGay Police Harassment,87 GEO. L.J. 2431, 2460-61 (1999).
120. See, e.g., 'Romeos' Can Avoid Sex Offender Status, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
May 3, 2007, at 5B (discussing Florida law exempting juvenile offenders who are no more
than four years older than their sexual partner, when the partner is at least fourteen years
old, and when a court determines that the encounter was consensual).
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of registrants nationwide grew from 277,000 to 386,000121 and from
2001 to 2007 to over 614,000,122 a 221% increase in less than a decade.
Today, United States sex offender registries combined contain an excess
of 700,000 individuals.1 23 With the AWA's expanded eligibility
requirements as a floor, and states continuing to add their own criteria,
the number of registrants should soon easily pass the one-million mark.
With increased registration, in turn, will come corresponding increases
in community notification, especially if the AWA's conviction-based
approach becomes the national norm.
II. POLITICAL CATALYSTS
Today, state, federal, and local politics regarding criminal justice
policy are well known for their highly reactive nature, manifesting' 124a
predisposition that William Stuntz famously termed "pathological."
Politicians of both main parties typically compete to out-tough one
another and operate under sway of what has become a cardinal rule of
political self-preservation: never appear "soft" on crime. 125 The
political bias toward toughness has been fed and perpetuated by the 24/7
news cycle, which ensures public attention for victimizations and
heightens the political consequences for politicians caught in the media
vortex. 126 Rounding out the political process failure, with criminal
justice there typically exists no countervailing political force or 127
lobby
that might temper or modify possibly misguided policy measures.
Without question, registration and notification bear the earmarks of
121. DEVON B. ADAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF STATE SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRIES, 2001 1 (2002), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sssor0l.pdf. The report
notes that for 2001 data from Massachusetts was not included, although Massachusetts
reported that 17,000 individuals were registration-eligible. Id. at 2. Also, 1998 data from
Connecticut was omitted. Id.
122. The figures cited in the text result from data cited in Adams's Summary. Id. For
the

"Parents

for

Megan's

Law"

website,

see

PARENTS

FOR

MEGAN'S

LAW,

http://www.parentsformeganslaw.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
123. See Marc Klaas, Megan's Law Legislation in All 50 States, KLAAS KIDS
FOUNDATION, http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-legmeg.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
124. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 505 (2001).
125. See KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3-6 (1997); Harry A. Chemoff et al., The Politics of
Crime, 33 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 527, 531-32 (1996).
126. See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media's Influence on Criminal Justice Policy:

How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 397-98,
402 (2006).
127. See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?,
44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079-80, 1082 (1993).
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this political dynamic. While as late as the 1970s the American response
to crime was defined mainly by a desire to rehabilitate and not punish
offenders, starting in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, when
registration and notification took shape, American criminal justice
became unabashedly punitive. 1 28 The 1990s were also marked by an
unprecedented desire to get tough on sex offenders, the principal targets
of registration and notification and a subpopulation inspiring special
hatred and disdain.129 Prison terms increased dramatically,' 30 triggering
massive increases in sex offender prison populations,' 3' and several
states adopted laws permitting chemical and surgical castration of sex
offenders. 132 Registration and notification were thus part of a broader
shift toward harsh crime control responses, responding to what David
Garland called the "sense of a fearful, angry public."' 3 3 Registration, a
social control strategy that essentially lay dormant for decades, despite
myriad criminal depravations in the intervening years, enjoyed new life
in the early 1990s, assuming far more onerous form over time. And
with it came community notification, as well, with the harsh personal
consequences for those it targeted.
As discussed next, however, explanation for the marked political
success of registration and notification also lies in several other chief
factors, which distinguished it from other punitive social control
measures of recent times.
A. Panic Redux
A common framework for conceiving of the recent harsh wave of
provisions targeting sex offenders, including registration and
128. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 193-95 (2003).

AND THE

129. See James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of the
Origins andResults of the Myths Surrounding Their Crimes and Treatment Amenability, 25
DEVIANT BEHAV. 215, 217-19 (2004).
130. See Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing
Commission 's Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOWA L. REV.
563, 571-72 (2002).
131.

See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND
AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 17 (1997),

OFFENDERS:

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF (noting that from 1980 to 1994, while
state prison populations increased 206%, the number of imprisoned sex offenders rose
330%).
132. See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., CaliforniaChild Molesters Face 'Chemical
Castration,'N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at Al.
133.

DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 10 (2001).
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notification laws, is that of a "panic." In his study of state laws enacted
in the late 1930s permitting the involuntary commitment of "sexual
psychopaths" to psychiatric institutions, sociologist Edwin Sutherland
identified the following process at work: first, the "community is
thrown into [a] panic by a few serious sex crimes, which are given
nation-wide publicity; [next,] the community acts in an agitated manner,
and all sorts of proposals are made; [finally,] a committee is...
appointed to study the facts and to make recommendations." 13 4 In 1972,
another sociologist, Stanley Cohen, studied the exaggerated response in
England to "Mods and Rockers," teenage groups who, in the mid-i 960s,
engaged in a series of minor disturbances. 135 Cohen observed that
"[s]ocieties appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of
moral panic," resulting in the "moral barricades [being] manned by
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people," and drastic
solutions proffered. 136 That the actual extent and nature of the
disturbances was distorted, and the images of the nefarious youth gangs
largely invented, was of no moment;
what mattered was that the
37
particular social threat was perceived. 1
The panic model, while running the risk of unduly downplaying
the seriousness of sexual victimization (with its implicit comparison to
teenage social hooliganism), nonetheless provides a helpful conceptual
model. The panic itself can be traced to the July 1981 disappearance of
six-year-old Adam Walsh in Hollywood, Florida that captivated the
nation's attention. 138 After the boy's severed head was discovered in a
canal, his parents, John and Reve Walsh, initiated a national crusade to
address the problem of missing and abducted children.'1 39 In testimony
before Congress, John Walsh related that "[m]ore than 1.5 million
children are reported missing every year"
and "we don't have clues to
1 40
what happened to over 50,000 of them."
Congress responded by creating the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, appointing John Walsh as head.'14 By 1985,
over one hundred agencies, with annual combined funding in excess of
134. Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. Soc.

142, 142 (1950).
135.

STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANIcS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS

AND ROCKERS 1 (Routledge 3d ed. 2002) (1972).

136. Id. at 1.
137. Id. at 1, 3.
138. Keith S. Hampton, Children in the War on Crime: Texas Sex Offender Mania and

the Outcasts of Reform, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 781, 782-83 (2001).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 784.
141. Id. at 784-85.
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$15 million, were engaged in the campaign against child abductions,
milk
increasing public awareness by such efforts as emblazoning
42
cartons and cereal boxes with the faces of missing children. 1
The panic, however, soon lost steam, undercut by claims that
abduction rates had been exaggerated 143 and public focus soon readily
shifted to child sexual victimization. The groundwork for this transition
was laid in the early 1980s with trials stemming from reported mass
child sexual abuse at the McMartin preschool in Southern California
and a day care center in rural Jordan, Minnesota, which received
sustained media attention and prompted congressional hearings. 144 By
1990, when the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
merged with the Adam Walsh Child Resource Center, child sexual
molestation had become a major focus of national concern. 145
Panic, however, accounts for only part of the story. Sex crime
panics have beset the nation before. Their net outcome, however, pales
when compared to the uniquely severe, comprehensive, and sustained
legislative response of the 1990s resulting in today's nationwide
network of registration and notification laws. American jurisdictions
targeted sex offenders with registration starting in the 1930s, and from
the late 1930s through the 1960s, laws permitting the commitment of
"sexual psychopaths" were widely adopted. 146 Commitment laws,

142. Id. at 785.
143. A key influence was a Denver Post 1985 expos6 reporting that 330,000, not 1.5
million, children were reported missing annually, and that most of the children were
runaways. Moreover, fewer than one thousand children were the victims of homicide, and
most were victimized by an acquaintance or relative-not trench-coated strangers. See
Diana Griego & Louis Kilzer, The Truth About Missing Children: ExaggeratedStatistics
Stir National Paranoia,DENVER POST, May 12, 1985, at 12A. Other studies raising doubts
soon followed. See, e.g., DAVID FNKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MISSING,
ABDUCTED,

RUNAWAY,

AND THROWNAWAY

CHILDREN IN AMERICA

V, vi, Xv (1990),

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/nismart90.pdf (concluding that in 1988, of the
estimated 3,200 to 4,600 nonfamily abductions, only 200 to 300 were "stereotypical
kidnappings" and that from 1976 to 1987, an estimated forty-three to 147 "stranger
abduction homicides" occurred annually. Furthermore, missing children fell into five
categories, with at least four of the categories containing children who "were not literally
missing." Rather, their location was known; "the problem was in recovering them."); John
Gill, Missing-Kids Groups Foster FearRather than Facts, NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 11,
1989, at 65 (discussing 1989 study indicating that only fifty-two to 158 children annually
were killed or abducted by strangers).
144. Lynne Henderson, Without Narrative:Child Sexual Abuse, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y &
L. 479, 495-97 (1997).
145. Brian E. Albrecht, What's Happened to the Missing Kids?, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio) Mar. 4, 1990, availableat 1990 WL 4606879.
146. See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the
Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 325 (2003).
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however, devolved into near non-existence over ensuing decades and
registration attracted comparatively little interest. 147 Only in the 1990s
did registration-with its predominant focus on sex offenderscombined with notification, fully blossom.
B. Politics of Personalizationand Dehumanization

Changes in political modus operandi also played a key role. Like
prior harsh laws originating amid panics, registration and notification
laws in the 1990s were triggered by gruesome events. Modem
registration and notification, however, differed not only in degree but
also in kind, drawing political strength from intense focus upon
particular victims and their survivors (typically parents). At the same
time, the political atmosphere giving rise to the laws was unique for its
unprecedented tendency to depersonalize and dehumanize the
individuals principally targeted-sex offenders.
The foundation for the victim-centrism aspect was laid in the
1970s when victims' advocates, building on the successes of the
women's rights movement, 148 succeeded not only in increasing the role
of victims in the criminal justice process, 149 but also in emphasizing the
harms they suffered.1 50 Registration and notification advocates also
learned from the successes of child abuse advocates in the 1980s who
skillfully used victim narrative and imagery, especially concerning
female and child victims of physical and sexual abuse, to great political
effect. 151
The emphasis was very evident in Congress. From 1991, when
Minnesota Senator David Durenberger invoked the plight of Jacob
Wetterling to underscore the need for registration, to 2006, when the
federal Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act was enacted,
147. See id at 325-26. Concerns over the vague "psychopath" category, over and
under-inclusiveness, statistically unfounded assertions of high sex offender recidivism, and
the fallibility of predictive expertise resulted in the laws being ignored or repealed by the
1970s. Id. The commitment laws, as Philip Jenkins observed, came to be viewed "as a
model example of failed legislation called forth by politicians pandering to ill-focused
public fears but that had done nothing to reduce crime or detain the truly dangerous."
PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN

93 (1998).
See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING 20-24 (2000).
149. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights Movement,
1985 UTAH L. REV. 517, 518 (1985).
150. See Wayne A. Logan, Through the PastDarkly: A Survey of the Uses and Abuses
of Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Trials,41 ARIZ. L. REv. 143, 191 (1999).
AMERICA

148.

151.

See JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT CHILD

VicTiMs 46-50, 71 (1990).
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stories of individual victims dominated the legislative process. Just one
example among many occurred in 1994 when efforts were redoubled in
the U.S. House of Representatives to augment registration with
notification after Megan Kanka's sexual abuse and murder.
Representative Dick Zimmer (R-NJ), a chief advocate, recounted that,
on July 29, 1994, a beautiful little girl named Megan Kanka was lured
into the home of a man who literally lived across the street from her.
He said that he had a puppy he wanted to show her. He then
proceeded to brutally rape and murder this little girl. 152
In myriad other instances, legislators nationwide recounted in detail the
Megan Kanka tragedy, along with other less publicized victimizations,
demanding that laws be enacted.
The political strategy proved highly successful. Putting victims'
faces on initiatives humanized and rendered more understandable the
posited urgent need for policy change. It also inoculated proposed
legislation against challenge. Opponents risked being portrayed not
only as "soft on crime," but also "anti-victim," or, even more
deleterious, "anti-this victim." As Representative William Martini (RNJ) stressed in urging adoption of the federal Megan's Law in 1996:
' 53
"We must not allow this little girl's life to be taken in vain.'
"Megan's legacy ... her
Representative Zimmer urged that the law was
' 154
gift to all children whose lives will be saved."
The ultimate success of this personalization is manifest in the
names of the laws themselves-Megan's Law (U.S. and New Jersey),
Zachary's Law (Indiana), Ashley's Law (Texas), or any of the litany of
other state laws. The zenith was perhaps recently reached with the
federal Adam Walsh Act (AWA) in 2006, which enshrined the law's
namesake as well as the names of seventeen other victims in the law's
"Declaration of Purpose," along with brief personal descriptions and
how they were victimized.155 The law was enacted "to protect the
public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in
response to the vicious attacks by violent predatorsagainst the victims"
specified. 156 Wary of in any way besmirching the memory of prior
namesakes, Congress established within the broader AWA "the Jacob
Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Program," victims already named in the

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

142 CONG. REc. H4452 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
142 CONG. REc. E732 (daily ed. May 8, 1996) (statement of Rep. Martini).
142 CONG. REc. H4453 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
Id. (emphasis added).
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list of seventeen. 1
The political personalization of victims, however, was
complemented by the almost as potent demonization of their assailants,
such as Jesse Timmendequas (convicted of the rape and murder of
Megan Kanka). Whereas in the past, such as the 1930s when
involuntary commitment laws were enacted by many states and
victimizers were most often referenced in laws in clinical terms,
158
Timmendequas5 9 and his cohort were referred to as "beast[s],"'
160
"monster[s],"'
and the "human equivalent of toxic waste."'
The political logic behind this rhetorical shift is explained by a
large academic literature, highlighting the social solidification and
harshening effect of semantic demonization. 161 Recently, Cass Sunstein
applied the model to explain the imperative behind the nation's post9/11 responses. 162 As Sunstein points out, recent antiterrorism laws and
military campaigns benefited from having concrete antagonists-Osama
bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, in particular-upon whom to affix
outrage and scorn. 163 "If a wrongdoer has a clear identity-a face and a
narrative-the public is far more likely to support an aggressive
response."' 64 Like the character Emmanuel Goldstein in George
Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, a despised enemy of the state
inspiring public fear and disdain, Sunstein sees Osama and Saddam as
fueling the nation's willingness to back harsh measures. 165
A similar "Goldstein Effect" has informed the nation's ongoing
effort to single out antagonists such as Jesse Timmendequas for harsh
treatment and public scorn, lending credence to Jeremy Bentham's
observation that social policies informed by antipathy for "individuals
who are represented as dangerous and vile, pushes them onward to an

157. Id. §16902.
158. 140 CONG. REc. S 11301 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
159. 142 CONG. REC. S8638 (daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
160. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting minutes from
New York Assembly).
161.

See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS

OF POLLUTION AND TABOO (Vail-Ballou Press 1980) (1966); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE
ANATOMY OF DISGUST (Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (1997); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous
Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J.

829, 830-31 (2000).
162.

Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and

Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 507 (2007).
163. Id.at 542-43.
164. Id.at 543.
165. Id. at 542-43.
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undue severity." 1 66 As Representative Randall "Duke" Cunningham (RCA) vividly framed the issue in 1996: "perhaps a sexual predator's life
a little more toxic than someone [else's] in the American
should be '1just
67
citizenry."
C. Risk Aversion and Scientism
Yet another causal factor concerned a shift in modern sensibility:
the increasing tendency to conceive of and respond to social challenges
and problems in terms of risk, what in 1991 Anthony Giddens saw as a
"risk culture" marked by "a calculative attitude." 1 8 From the 1990s
through the present, as Cass Sunstein has noted, the reigning view has
been that "regulators should take steps to protect against potential
harms, even if causal chains are unclear and even if we do not know that
those harms will come to fruition."' 69 Whereas in the past authorities
sought to identify and monitor dangerous individuals, modern policy
conceived of danger in aggregate terms: what Malcolm Feeley and
Jonathan Simon in 1992 called a "new penology."' 170 Criminal risk
came to be understood in aggregate statistical terms and seen as a
constant, a social fact to be managed.171 The new penology, Feeley and
intervene or
Simon wrote, "seeks to regulate levels of deviance, not
172
malformations."'
social
or
deviants
respond to individual
Registration and notification laws were driven by and reflected this
orientation. While personal tragedies and names of victims might have
differed among jurisdictions, from the outset, discourse was dominated
by assertions that sex offenders were intractably compulsive, predatory,
and unusually prone to recidivism. Alarming statistics adduced by
political leaders have, in turn, been absorbed by the media 173 and the
166. Jeremy Bentham, Principlesof PenalLaw, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
401 (John Bowring ed., 1966) (1843).
167. 142 CONG. REC. H10313 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Cunningham).
168.

ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE

LATE MODERN AGE 3, 28 (1991).
169.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 4

(2005).
170.

Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the

Emerging Strategy of Corrections andIts Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992).
171. Id.

172. Id. at 452 (emphasis in original).
173. See, e.g., David Van Biema et al., Burn Thy Neighbor, TIME MAGAZINE, July 26,
1993, at 58 (referring to violent sex offenders as "irredeemable monsters"); David A.
Kaplan et al., The Incorrigibles, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1993, at 48 (emphasizing that
recidivism rates for sex offenders are higher than other violent offender subpopulations);
Lorraine Woellert, Virginia Bills Propose Registryfor Sex Offenders, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 27,
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public, 174 leading to a self-perpetuating legislative process resulting in
today's nationwide network of registration and notification laws.
Perceived statistical risk, however, not only motivated registration
and notification laws; it also infused their very nature. A single
factor-a conviction-has triggered application of the laws. Today,
under the AWA and most state regimes, conviction of an enumerated
crime determines the duration of registration and the intervals at which
registry information must be updated. 175 And the conviction criterion
itself often sweeps up broad offender groups without consideration of
particular circumstances, and singles out crimes not known to pose
particular risk (such as murder) and non-assaultive crimes (such as
peeping). 176 The group-based actuarial emphasis of community
notification, especially the dominant conviction-based approach, further
manifests this orientation.
The reasons for this state of affairs are, without question, complex
and numerous. Two partial explanations, however, lie in the teachings
of social psychology-in particular, what is called the "psychometric
paradigm" of risk perception and management.' 77 Under this view,
statistics tend to lack persuasive influence on the public, which
interprets life situations in a "richer" manner, assigning importance to
such considerations as whether a risk is involuntarily suffered or
especially dreaded. 178 On this account, sexual victimizations of women
and children qualify as particularly compelling catalysts. This is so
despite the reality, discussed below, that the prototypical "stranger
danger" circumstances informing public understanding of the threats
posed do not statistically warrant equivalent concern.
1994, at Al (registration of sex offenders is justified "because they have the highest rate of
recidivism").
174. See, e.g., Jill S. Levenson et al., Public PerceptionsAbout Sex Offenders and
Community Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES AND PUB. POL'Y 137, 142-43

(2007),
available
at
http://www.ccoso.org/library/o20articles/PublicPerceptions%20ASAP%207.pdf
(reporting survey data from a Florida community reflecting that considerable majorities
believe in extremely high sex offender recidivism rates, homogeneity of sex offender
population, and extent of sexual abuse committed by strangers).
175. LOGAN, supra note 4, at 69-70.

176. Id. at 67.
177. See generally Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rohrmann, Risk Perception Research - An
Introduction, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 11,

17 (Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rohrmann eds., 2000); Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK 220, 222 (Ragnar E. Lbfstedt ed., 2000).

178. See Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of
Attitudes Toward Technological Risks and Benefits, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note

177, at 80, 99.
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The laws also bear the earmarks of a related construct known as an
"availability heuristic," whereby a focal point serves "as a mental
shortcut for a more deliberative or analytic assessment of the underlying
issues"' 79 and drives public perception of risk out of proportion to
empirical reality.' 8 0 As Professor Sunstein has summarized the
literature:
When people use the availability heuristic, they assess the magnitude
of risks by asking whether examples can readily come to mind. For
example, "a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear
more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are
less retrievable." If people can easily think of relevant examples, they
likely to be frightened and concerned than if they
are far18more
1
cannot.
The victimizations of Megan Kanka and others by strangers, while
not statistically representative, have thus served as highly potent
availability heuristics. And like other heuristics, they have exercised a
skewing effect on policy, resulting from the ancillary influence of
"probability neglect."' 182 "The availability heuristic and probability
neglect," Sunstein observes, "often lead people to treat risks as much
greater than they are in fact, and hence to accept risk-reduction
strategies that do considerable harm and little good." 183 Such has been
the case with registration and notification. By focusing on "stranger
danger," harsh laws have been adopted and Americans, while
optimistically comforted by the notion that danger emanates from
unfamiliar others, have been distracted from the troubling reality that
should fear most are relatives, friends, and
the people they
84
1
acquaintances.
D. Information Entitlement
Another explanatory factor centers on the appeal of community
notification itself. While early-generation registration laws reserved
information on registrants to law enforcement, and even the prospect
that identifying information on ex-offenders would become public was
179. Sunstein, supra note 162, at 522, 534.
180. SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 35-41.
181. Sunstein, supra note 162, at 534-35 (quoting Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)).
182. SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 39-41.
183. Id. at 222.
184. Cf BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF
THE WRONG THINGS xi, XV (1999). See generally Jeffrey Kluger, How Americans Are
Living Dangerously,TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 26, 2006.
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strongly condemned, by the 1990s things had changed. The public
demanded that the government release information on registrants and
the government readily complied. This transformation chiefly stemmed
from a newfound sense of information entitlement. Outraged that
authorities possessed information on potentially dangerous individuals,
yet failed to make it available, communities insisted on a right to access.
As Maureen Kanka stated in a 1996 letter to the House Judiciary
Committee during its consideration of what came to be Megan's Law:
If pedophiles are going to be out on the street where they can accost
children, then parents have the right to know if they live on their
streets. My daughter Megan would be alive today if I had known that
my neighbor was a twice convicted pedophile. I had the responsibility
to protect my daughter. I have always told my children that I would
never let anything happen to them. But I guess I lied. I could not
protect my Megan as she was being brutally raped and murdered
across the street from my home. I have to live with85 the fact that she
screamed out my name as she was being murdered.'
In keeping with this sentiment, the Megan Nicole Kanka Foundation
website proclaims that "[e]very parent should have the right to
know if
86
a dangerous sexual predator moves into their neighborhood."1
This asserted entitlement, typically made by parents suffering
grievous loss, in itself would likely have accounted for the political
success of community notification. It also benefitted, however, from a
broader shift in public sensibility over the role of government
commencing in the 1990s. As Margaret Canovan has observed, the era
witnessed emergence of the "state as a 'service station,"' marked by a
view that citizens were consumers with desires that the state must
identify and satisfy. 187 The sentiment assumed especially potent form
with respect to public safety. Before 1990, communities privileged and
trusted government to protect them against recidivist criminal risk. The
damage wrought by Jesse Timmendequas and others shattered this faith.
While Washington's community notification law itself was ostensibly
motivated by a neutral goal of achieving greater governmental
transparency and accountability,' 88 there was no mistaking that it-like
185. Crimes Against Children and Elderly Persons Increased Punishment Act:
Hearing on H.R. 2974 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th CONG. 99 (1996) (testimony of Maureen Kanka).
Our
Mission,
MEGAN
NICOLE
KANKA
FOUNDATION,
186.
http://www.megannicolekankafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2010).
187. See MARGARET CANOVAN, NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL THEORY 85-87 (1996).
188. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550 (West 2005) ("Release of information
about sexual predators ... will further the governmental interests of public safety and public
scrutiny of the criminal and mental health systems .... ").
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every community notification law enacted since 1990-was driven by
this sense of betrayal and lack of trust.
The public, in short, came to feel that it was entitled to registrant
information not only as a moral matter but also due to practical
necessity. Government had shown that its historic monopoly on
information was unjustified; community members needed access to
such information so that they could take self-protective measures. As
discussed later, whether public disclosure of registrants' information in
fact secures personal safety remains unclear. However, from the outset,
the assumption that it does affect personal safety has driven legislative
89
efforts, as evidenced in arguments made by political leaders,'
90
"findings" in state laws, 1 and websites. 191
This sense of entitlement also significantly affected political
discourse. To the extent that the benefits associated with notification
would unfairly impact convicted criminals, the apparent choice faced by
political leaders was really no choice at all. The community's right to
information readily trumped any possible registrant concerns.
Politicians defiantly cast their lot with communities with numerous state
laws explicitly stating that communities' right to have access to
information92 superseded registrants' putative right to privacy in
particular.'
Moreover, political appeal was augmented by a secondary benefit:
shaming. With community notification, as David Garland has observed,
society can "simultaneously punish the offender for his crime and alert
the community to his danger."' 93 Indeed, use of pejorative terms such as
189. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. 22945 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Dunn) (advocating notification because it would allow citizens "to take the necessary

precautions to ensure that there are not second, third or fourth victims.").
190. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(A)(1) (West 2006)
provided adequate notice and information ... members of the public and
develop constructive plans to prepare themselves and their children.").
191. See, e.g., Sex Offender Information, ARIZONA DEP'T. OF
https://www.azdps.gov/services/sexoffender/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2011)

("If the public is
communities can
PUBLIC SAFETY,
("Furnishing the

public with information regarding convicted sex offenders is a critical step toward
encouraging the public... from potential future attacks.").
192. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412(6.5)(a) (West 2003) ("The general
assembly finds that persons convicted of an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior
have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public safety.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101(b)(3) (West 2004) ("[P]ersons convicted of these sexual

offenses have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the public's interest in public
safety ....In balancing the offender's due process and other fights against the interest of
public security, the general assembly finds that releasing information about sexual offenders
...will further the primary governmental interest of protecting vulnerable populations from
harm.").
193. GARLAND, supra note 133, at 181.
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"predator" suggests that community notification is about something
more than mere record keeping and informational empowerment; so,
too, does the staggering number of "hits" to state and federal internet
registries that disseminate information on registrants far beyond their
communities, which is the geographic region of avowed concern.
E. FederalGovernment
A final and quite important factor accounting for modern
registration and notification laws stems from the policy involvement of
the federal government. Historically, criminal justice was regarded as
principally a matter of state government concern. 194 Starting in the late
nineteenth century, however, what Lawrence Friedman has termed the
"culture of mobility," fostered by the increasing availability of
automobiles and railroads, made state boundaries "increasingly porous"
for criminal offenders.' 95 Believing the states ill-equipped to address
this shift, 196 Congress during the first decades of the twentieth century
gradually expanded the reach of federal criminal law. 197
Registration and countless other criminal justice undertakings
nevertheless remained the focus of state and local governments, and the
federal impact on criminal justice matters remained limited and
episodic. Crime control, however, has long since been federalized and
congressional intrusiveness has likewise been felt with registration and
notification policy.' 98 While registration was certainly of interest to the
states by 1994, when Congress pressured states to create registries by
threatening to withhold significant criminal justice funds, and
notification was popular in the states by 1996, when Congress mandated
it, there is no mistaking that federal pressure drove the current
nationwide network of laws and that it was especially instrumental in
overcoming initial state ambivalence over notification.
Federal intrusiveness with respect to registration has had two main
consequences. First, by conditioning receipt of federal funds on state
compliance with its requirements, the federal government compelled
those states perhaps not otherwise inclined to adopt registration and
notification laws to do so. Second, by tying receipt of federal funds to
adoption of federal requirements, the United States modified the
194. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (emphasizing that
that crime control "has always been the province of the States").
195. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 20910, 263-67 (1993).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See Logan, CriminalJustice Federalism,supra note 94, at 53-87.
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substantive content of state laws, requiring them to adopt federal
minima with respect to such matters as the offenses triggering
registration, registration of juveniles, duration of registration, and use of
a "conviction-based" classification system. While states have often
exceeded the federal "floor," the impact of federal involvement overall
has been to make state laws not only more uniform, but also more
demanding-to in effect "level up" registration and notification policy.
Moreover, the federal policy preferences imposed have borne
earmarks of having originated in a national legislative body that is
fundamentally distinct from its state legislative counterparts, especially
on cost and practicality concerns. While states very often must balance
budgets and temper criminal justice desires with fiscal and real-world
constraints, federal policy is developed in an environment largely inured
to such concerns, 199 and federal politicians secure major political
benefits from their support of harsh laws. State legislatures, in turn, do
not relish being accused of failing to secure "free" federal funds and do
not wish to look "soft" by renouncing federal minimum requirements
relative to the disdained targets of registration and notification. With
the door open to amendments, states have added to the minima with
ardor.
Finally, federal influence has been manifest in a more subtle but
quite important respect. Congress has fostered and sustained a political
climate conducive to state registration and notification laws. State
legislators, themselves in the C-SPAN audience and acutely aware of
the political salience of toughened requirements, have seized the
opportunity, enacting provisions with impressive speed. And, as with
criminal justice policy more generally, 20 0 registration has been a oneway ratchet, with provisions getting tougher by the year, backed by
overwhelming bipartisan political support.
III. STASIS

The foregoing discussion of factors contributing to the origin and
evolution of registration and community notification laws has obvious
bearing when seeking explanation of how and why the laws have been
sustained. Indeed, the same factors go a long way toward explaining
the latter. Nevertheless, as the work of political scientist Paul Pierson

199. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politicsof Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.

REv. 1276, 1303 (2005) (noting the tendency of Congress to enact laws of "the 'feel-good,
do-something' variety rather than to seek out the most cost-effective way to address a
particular problem.").
200. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
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and others establish, the durability of laws, especially in the face of data
suggesting adoption of an alternate policy, has a distinct etiology of its
own. "Path dependence" and "lock-in," evidenced in the political world
more generally, usefully describe the staying power of registration and
community notification laws. 0 1
Most fundamentally, dependency and lock-in are evident in the
aversion for any reappraisal of the laws' use in principle. While in the
past, concern over the negative "psychic effect" of registration, alone,
prompted significant resistance and inspired comparisons to totalitarian
regimes, 2°2 registration today---even when combined with community
notification-has been readily accepted. There are several reasons for
this.
First and foremost, the political cost associated with change would
simply be too great. For politicians, when it comes to crime control
matters, as Michael Tonry has noted: "Leaving things as they are poses
no electoral risks.... No one loses elections for failing to lead or

support a campaign for repeal of laws that are tough ....

,,203

Indeed,

any effort to soften crime policy risks not only sound-bite reprisals from
political opponents, with dreaded consequences on election day, but
also the condemnation of advocacy groups. 20 4 "Report cards," issued
by watchdog groups, provide state-by-state assessments of the perceived
vigor of registration and notification laws, 20 5 and popular media such as
"The O'Reilly Factor" add to the political pressure. 2 6 This atmosphere,
201.
ANALYSIS

See

PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND

SOCIAL

on the
phenomenon of market product choices that are sustained despite available knowledge
supporting incorrect knowledge bases on which the initial choices are conditioned. See,
e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 IJ.L.
(2004). The concepts also figure in economic analysis, forcing

ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
202. See Current Notes, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

295,295 (1936).
203. MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN
PENAL CULTURE 15 (2004).
204. A related example is found in the recent experience of Iowa with its law placing
limits on where registrants can live. State legislators there rejected a proposal by law
enforcement associations to modify the law, based on its detrimental effects. Editorial, Who
Will Stand Upfor Making Kids Safer?, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Iowa), Dec. 14, 2007, at A4.
205. For instance, the group "Parents for Megan's Law" has maintained on its website
results from annual surveys, with states receiving grades of A-F. See Zachary R. Dowdy,
NY Gets a D on Sex Offender Survey, NEWSDAY, Apr. 29, 2006, at A12.
206. For instance, after Bill O'Reilly categorized Alabama among the "states that
don't seem to care about this issue at all," the Alabama Legislature convened a special
session to consider tougher registration and community-notification requirements. Recent
Legislation, Criminal Law-Sex Offender Notification Statute-Alabama Strengthens
Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 119 HARv. L. REv. 939, 942 (2006). After the requirements
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in turn, is only faintly tempered by critics of the laws. While criminal
defense and civil liberties interests have over time sought to beat back
the laws, their impact has been limited at best. Meanwhile, registrants
themselves, even if not subject to voter disenfranchisement, have like
other ex-offenders exercised scant political influence.20 7
Of equal if not greater importance, politicians are naturally
reluctant to question the highly personalized laws. As noted earlier, any
effort to dismantle a provision designated as "Megan's" or "Zachary's"
Law, for instance, would be viewed as more than a mere policy shift.
Rather, it would risk being perceived as a personal assault on the
victims' memories and legacies.20 8
Lack of desire to question the status quo has been evidenced in the
notable dearth of empirical scrutiny to which the laws have been
subjected. Only very recently has empirical assessment become a
priority. For instance, only with the AWA in 2006 did Congress direct
the attorney general to assess the "efficiency," "effectiveness," and
resource consequences1 of conviction and risk-based classification
systems, 209 andAaset
asked the National Institute of Justice (the research arm
of the Department of Justice) to study other aspects of registration and
notification. 2 10 Remarkably, this action was taken twelve years after
Congress first required that states adopt registration (1994), ten years
after mandating community notification (1996), and at the same time as
the AWA itself confidently prescribed an array of fundamental changes
for state registration and notification systems.
Research that has been conducted, however, has not favored the
laws' advocates. Modern registries, like their historic forebears, are rife
with errors, undercutting their knowledge-based premise. In 2003, for
instance, state officials, on average, could not account for the
whereabouts of 24% of registrants, with several states (California and

were enacted, the governor echoed the sentiments of a state senator that "no one can say that
Alabama is 'soft on sex offenders."' Id
207. See Wayne A. Logan, "DemocraticDespotism" and Constitutional Constraint:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.

J. 439, 468-69, 495 (2004) (surveying extensive public choice literature noting the political
impotence of ex-offenders).
208. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
209. 42 U.S.C. § 16991 (2006).
210. The Institute is to assess the new law's effectiveness in (1) increasing compliance
with registration and notification requirements; (2) enhancing public safety; and (3)
optimizing public dissemination of registrants' information on the Internet. Id. §§ 16990(a)(b), 16991. The AWA also requires assessment of associated "costs and burdens" and
recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of registration. Id.
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Massachusetts, 44%; Oklahoma, 50%) having especially high rates.
Moreover, eighteen states were unable to offer even an estimate of how
many registrants were non-compliant.2 12 Such flaws, while to be
expected of an honor-based system targeting persons with proven
criminal antisocial tendencies, are nonetheless deeply problematic.
Without reliable registry information, police cannot monitor and
apprehend recidivist registrants; the public cannot assist police and take
self-protective measures; and registrants themselves will not be
susceptible of police and community surveillance.
Even more problematic, flawed registries give rise to a false sense
of informational security, which aggravates the false empiric premises
on which the laws are based. Today, we know that most sex crimes are
committed by first-time offenders, who by definition are not registered,
making registration and notification significantly under-inclusive.2 13
We also know that the overwhelming proportion of sex offenders
targeting children, the main concern of the laws, are related to or
otherwise known to victims. 21 4 Despite this awareness, registration and
notification are motivated by the expectation of "stranger danger" and
the need to inform potential victims of unknown risks. Finally, contrary
to the view that information on registrants is needed to help their
neighbors self-protect, empirical work suggests that recidivists often
21 5
look beyond their neighborhoods for victims.
The more general public safety value of the laws also remains in
doubt. Empirical work typically shows that the laws have little or no
effect on sexual offending rates and recidivism. 2 16 At the same time,
211.

Kim Curtis, Survey: States Have Lost Track of Thousands of Sex Offenders,
PRESS,
Feb.
7,
2003,
available
at
http://www.rentalresearch.com/CaliforniaLoosesSexOffenders.pdf.
212. Id.
213. Bob Edward Visquez et al., The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws in the United States: A Time-Series Analysis, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 175,
179 (2008).
214. See Robert Freeman-Longo, Myths and Facts About Sex Offenders, CENTER FOR
ASSOCIATED

SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, Aug. 2000, http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythfacts.html.

215. See, e.g., Grant Duwe et al., Does Residential Proximity Matter? A Geographic
Analysis of Sex Offense Recidivism, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 484, 500 (2008).

216. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al., Effects of South Carolina'sSex Offender
Registration and Notification Policy on Deterrenceof Adult Sex Crimes, 37 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 537, 550 (2010); Richard Tewksbury & Wesley G. Jennings, Assessing the Impact
of Sex Offender Registrationand Community Notification on Sex-Offending Trajectories,37
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 570, 572 (2010); Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Boil?

A Time-Series Analysis of New York State's Sex Offender Registration andNotification Law,
14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 284, 299 (2008); Richard G. Zevitz, Sex Offender

Community Notification: Its Role in Recidivism and Offender Reintegration, 19 CRIM. JUST.
STUD. 193, 200-03 (2006); Kristin Zgoba et al., An Analysis of the Effectiveness of
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registration and community notification impose significant hardships on
registrants, including stressors known to hinder crime desistance and
community reintegration. 2 17 Registrants-and often their families and
friends-regularly experience harassment, job terminations and
increased difficulty finding employment, housing disruption,
depression, loss and diminution of personal relationships, and even
physical violence (including homicide).2 18 Community ire has even
been directed mistakenly at non-registrants, a not unlikely prospect
given registry address inaccuracies. Such negative effects are especially
problematic for juveniles, who are often subject to registration and
notification, despite their unique developmental stage, distinct treatment
responsiveness and offending profiles.2 19
At the same time, empirical work has failed to support the
information empowerment predicate that has motivated the laws from
the outset. Police, for their part, typically lack the resources and will to

monitor compliance, which undercuts the utility of the laws. 220 As for
community members, empirical work underscores that community
notification, even if based on accurate and comprehensive information,
fails to achieve the individual-level effect it is designed to achieve.
Registrant information, especially when disseminated via the now-

dominant method of government-run internet web sites, is often not
received by community members. 221 And even among community
members who do become aware of the presence of registrants, few
Community Notification and Registration: Do the Best Intentions Predict the Best
Practices?,27 JUST. Q. 667, 690 (2010).
217. See Naomi J. Freeman, The Public Safety Impact of Community Notification
Laws: Rearrest of Convicted Sex Offenders, CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 22 (May 2009); J.J.
Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect
CriminalBehavior? 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13803, 2008).
218. See, e.g., Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family
Members of Registered Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 54, 56 (2009); Jill S. Levenson
& Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan's Laws on Sex Offender Reintegration, 21 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 56 (2005).
219. See, e.g., DAVID F1NKELOR ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILES WHO
COMMIT
SEX
OFFENSES
AGAINST
MINORS
10
(2009),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/227763.pdf; Michael F. Caldwell, Sexual Offense
Adjudication and Sexual Recidivism Among Juvenile Offenders, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES.
& TREATMENT 107, 108 (2007); Erin B. Comartin et al., Family Experiences of Young Adult
Sex Offender Registration, 19 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 204, 206 (2010).
220. See, e.g., Amos Bridges, Registryfor Sex Crimes Lagging, SPRINGFIELD NEWSLEADER (Missouri), Apr. 30, 2007, at Al; James Macpherson, 'Monsters in Our Closets' Officials: Tracking Sex Offenders with Surprise Visits Spotty in Most Cities, GRAND FORKS
HERALD (North Dakota), Apr. 9, 2007, at Al.
221. See, e.g., Sarah W. Craun, EvaluatingAwareness of Registered Sex Offenders in
the Neighborhood,56 CRIME & DELINQ. 414,431 (2010).
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make substantial modifications in their self-protective behavior. 222
The laws also have significant fiscal consequences. In California,
for instance, in 2003 the attorney general estimated that $20 million was
needed to improve upon the state's error-riddled registry and operate an
effective one.22 3 Studies have also shown that the specter of the onerous
consequences of the laws can affect justice outcomes, ranging from
discouraging guilty pleas (increasing the volume of trials, which carries
expense, and exposes victims to the trauma of testifying), to possibly
discouraging the reporting of sexual offenses, the latter being especially
troublesome because it both avoids criminal accountability and possible
treatment and allows for continued victimization.22 4
Even more fundamentally, concern exists that the laws themselves
are premised on false empirical understandings of sexual offending, in
several important respects. First, it is now clear that the recidivismrelated premise of sex offender registration, in particular, is well off the
mark. Recidivism among sex offenders in general (defined to include
recommitting a sex offense) has been shown to range from five percent
to fourteen percent over three to six year follow-up periods,22 5 and
twenty-four percent over a fifteen year follow-up period. 2 6 Contrary to
legislative pronouncements, sex offenders have among the lowest
criminal recidivism rates, with robbers, burglars, and persons
committing nonsexual assault all recommitting similar crimes at
considerably higher rates. 227 In short, even though sexual victimization
without question remains a significant concern, and the full extent of
victimizations is known to be underreported,22 8 it is also clear that the
drive for registration and notification has been fueled by vastly
overstated understandings of recidivist risk.229
222. See, e.g., Amy L. Anderson & Lisa L. Sample, Public Awareness and Action
Resulting From Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV.
371, 389 (2008); see generally Victoria S. Beck & Lawrence Travis, III, Sex Offender
Notification: A Cross-State Comparison, 7 POLICE PRAC. AND RES. 293 (2006).
223. California:PoliceNeed $20Mto Enforce Megan's Law, 37 CRIME CONTROL DIG.
2, 6 (2003).
224. See generally Elizabeth J. Letorneau et al, Effects of Sex Offender Registration
Policies on Juvenile Justice Decision Making, 21 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 149
(2009).
225. ANDREW J.R. HARRIS & R. KARL HANSON, PUB. SAFETY & PREPAREDNESS CAN.,
SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM: A SIMPLE QUESTION 7-8 (2004).
226. Id.
227. TIMOTHY S. BYNUM ET. AL., CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 3, 5, 7 (2001).
228. Lisa L. Sample & Timothy M. Bray, Are Sex Offenders Different? An
Examination of Rearrest Patterns, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 83, 89 (2006).
229. Id. at 86.
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Second, sex offenders are a markedly heterogeneous criminal
subpopulation with respect to recidivist risk. Some sex offenders, such
as male pedophiles who victimize non-familial boys and male rapists
targeting women, do recidivate at alarmingly high rates. 230 Registration
laws, however, manifest a marked tendency to indulge in what social
scientists refer to as "overinclusive labeling," sweeping up individuals
convicted of crimes not especially associated with recidivist risk. 3 1
The difficulty of this over-inclusiveness is borne out by a recent
study evaluating the effect that imposition of the AWA's convictionbased classification approach on New York's risk-based approach.2 32
According to the study's authors, if a conviction-based regime were to
be used for individuals classified in Tier 1 (lowest risk) under the
AWA's approach were rearrested for both sexual and nonsexual
offenses more quickly than Tier 2 (moderate risk) and Tier 3 (highest
risk).233 The results, the authors concluded, suggested that adoption of
the AWA's conviction-based approach "[m]ay give community
members a false sense of security. That is, community members may
believe they are safe if no Tier 3 offenders are residing in their
neighborhood
when, in fact, Tier 3 offenders are not at increased risk to
234
reoffend."
Finally, contrary to the "stranger danger" predicate of the laws,
most sex offenses are not committed by strangers. Rather, while
offender profiles differ depending on the nature of the sex offense, the
overwhelming majority of child sexual victimizations are committed by
someone known by the victim. 235 For instance, from 1991-1996 only
seven percent of reported instances of child sexual victimizations
involved strangers-thirty-four percent were victimized by family and
fifty-nine percent by acquaintances. 3 6 Among adults age eighteen to
twenty-four, only twenty-four percent of sexual victimizations were

230. Id.at 86-87.
231. James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of the Origins
and Results of the Myths Surrounding Their Crimes and Treatment Amenability, 25
DEVIANT BEHAV. 215, 218-23 (2004).

232. See generally Naomi J. Freeman & Jeffrey C. Sandier, The Adam Walsh Act: A
False Sense of Security or an Effective Public Policy Initiative?, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV.
31(2010).

233. Id.at41.
234. Id. at 43.
235. HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM,
INCIDENT,
AND
OFFENDER
CHARACTERISTICS
10
(2000),

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf.
236. Id.
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committed by strangers, while the rate among older adults was thirty
percent. 237 Moreover, of the estimated 260,000 children kidnapped
annually, only approximately 115 were taken by strangers. 2338 Even
more problematic, the overwhelming majority of strangers committing
sex crimes are known to be first-time offenders, with no recorded
offending history, a statistic that belies the very premise of the laws. 239
Despite the foregoing, there is reason to be pessimistic over the
prospect that registration and notification policy will become more
evidence-based and susceptible of change. Recent reaction to the release
of two reports highly critical of registration and notification manifests
this resistance. In response to the September 2007 publication of a
Human Rights Watch study questioning the efficacy of the laws, Laura
Ahearn, executive director of Parent's for Megan's Law, retorted that
"[y]ou can't prove a negative. You can't prove a child hasn't been
sexually victimized because they haven't been." 240 Similarly, in
response to a May 2007 preliminary study by the State of New Jersey
indicating that Megan's Law had no effect on public safety, Maureen
Kanka responded by simply reiterating that if she "had known there was
a pedophile living across the street, Megan would be alive and well
today," and added that she knew "the effectiveness of the law because I
get e-mails about it all the time. 241
Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine how the laws will survive
continued criticism that they are based on the false premises of
heightened risk of sex offender recidivism and the threat of "stranger
danger." This impregnability stems in significant part from the earlier
noted influence of an availability heuristic, which causes individuals to
mispredict the likelihood of readily imagined events,242 and probability
neglect, which encourages individuals to focus on emotionally charged

237. Id.
238. Tara Bahrampour, Discovering a World Beyond the Front Yard: Some Parents
Defy Trends, Allow Kids to Roam Unsupervised, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2006, at C1 (citing
data from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children).
239. See, e.g., JEFFREY T. WALKER & GWEN ERVIN-MCLARTY, ARKANSAS CRIME
INFORMATION CENTER, SEX OFFENDERS IN ARKANSAS: CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS AND
ENFORCEMENT OF SEX OFFENDER LAWS 18 (2000) (stating that 73% of sex offenders in

registry sample surveyed were first-time offenders) (on file with author).
240. Angela Rozas, Sex-Offender Laws Called Ineffective: Study: No Evidence
Monitoring Works, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 2007, at 4.

241. Sam Wood, N.J. Study Scrutinizes Megan's Law Effect, PHILA. INQ., May 6, 2007,
at B 1.
242. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
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negative occurrences, rather than their empirical likelihood.24 3
Resistance, as the above quote from Maureen Kanka makes clear, is
also fueled by the common tendency to lend greater credence to
information that confirms preexisting beliefs and to ignore conflicting
information (confirmation bias). 2 "
In a time when more Americans report being concerned about sex
offenders than violent crime in general or even terrorism, 245 and
registration and notification are thought justified "if one child is saved,"
246
As
continued support for such measures should come as no surprise.
Franklin Zimring has observed, "belief in the effectiveness of a penal
statute is rooted in the citizens' conviction that the law is appropriate.
Since the penal measures feel right, they must be working well. 24 7
This is especially so if, as has been the case to date, empirical work is
unable to disentangle recent drops in rates of sexual victimization from
the contemporaneous proliferation of registration and community
notification laws. Advocates, until data definitively prove otherwise,
can assert that, despite growing research on the negative impact of the
laws on registrants and others (such as their families), the laws still have
possible public safety benefit.
It is also important to recognize that the laws, whatever their
impact, will likely remain popular due to their harsh effects on the
individuals they target--ex-criminal offenders. To a society
increasingly unforgiving and scared of criminal malefactors, especially
sex offenders, registration and notification are readily defensible: the
fact of a prior conviction standing alone, however inaccurate a proxy of
future dangerousness, justifies all personal hardships imposed. As Cass
Sunstein recently observed in his book Laws of Fear, "if indulging fear
is costless, because other people face the relevant burdens, then the
mere fact of 'risk,' and the mere presence of fear, will seem to provide a

243. See Cass R. Sunstein, ProbabilityNeglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, andLaw, 112
L.J. 61, 62-63 (2002).
244. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998) (describing confirmation bias as "the
inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question" and a "onesided case-building process.").
245. The JonBenet Ramsey Case: The Greatest Fear,ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2006, at
24, 25 (reporting results of Gallup poll).
246. Testament to this, according to one recent study, seventy-three percent of
residents in a Florida locality stated that they would support registration and notification
laws even if they were shown to have no crime reduction benefit. Jill S. Levenson et al.,
supranote 174, at 148-49.
247. FRANKLIN E. ZIMR1NG ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND
YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 221 (2001).
YALE
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justification., 248 When the "other people" are sex offenders the public
policy choice will likely continue to be an easy one. This is especially
so given that the choice carries the added expressive benefit of
condemning targeted individuals with epithets such as "predator."
For similar reasons, the laws will likely continue to be inured to the
persistent criticism that they are over-inclusive and unjustly driven by
worry over "false negatives," that is, individuals who recidivate but
about whom the community and police are not warned. Under such a
regime, the specter arises that, as Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart
observed in another context, "when everything is classified, then
nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by
the cynical or the careless ....,,249 Yet, over-inclusiveness again raises
no principled concern; indeed, it is preferred, even at the likely expense
of unhelpfully inundating the public with information (much of it
inaccurate or incomplete) on registrants undifferentiated by risk.2 5 °
Given that access to criminal history information is now seen as a
matter of consumerist entitlement, the hundreds of thousands of "false
positives" (persons required to register yet do not reoffend) are readily
acceptable to the public. And with the AWA, with its blunderbuss
conviction-based classification regime, the normative preference is now
national policy. This despite the increasing consensus of experts and
even Patty Wetterling (who played a foremost role in the genesis of
modem laws) that a more circumscribed regime based on individualized
risk assessments has greater promise. 251
Along these same lines, advocates will have cause to resist claims
that the laws wrongly focus on an overstated fear of "stranger danger."
Even accepting the empirical reality that most sex crimes are committed
by family members, friends, and acquaintances, registration and
community notification could still be said to have value. Presuming
that self-protective measures will be taken, notice of dangerous
248. SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 208.
249. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
250. See In re E.I., 693 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) ("[I]f Megan's
Law is applied literally and mechanically to virtually all sexual offenders, the beneficial
purpose of this law will be impeded.").
251. See, e.g., ScoTr MATSON ET AL., CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE,
COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION
AND
EDUCATION
(2001),
http://www.csom.org/pubs/notedu.html; Grant Duwe & William Donnay, The Impact of
Megan's Law on Sex Offender Recidivism: The Minnesota Experience, 46 CRIMINOLOGY
411 (2008); Levenson et al., supra note 174, at 154; see also Dan Gunderson, Sex Offender
Laws Have Unintended Consequences, MINN. PUB. RADIO (June 18, 2007),
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/06/1 1/sexoffender1.
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strangers is beneficial, but so is being told that someone familiar
committed a registerable offense, when such prior misconduct was not
previously known (an unlikely scenario among family, but quite
possible regarding friends and acquaintances). Also, even though
strangers commit a comparatively small percentage of registerable
crimes, their involvement could be deemed more harmful and fearsome
for individuals and communities, justifying the collection and
dissemination of information relative to them.252
A final reason accounting for the likely persistence of registration
and notification is that they have assumed an institutional life of their
own, ensuring a measure of staying power. As the governmental
infrastructure supporting registration and notification has grown over
time, pressure from its constituent parts can be expected to exercise a
self-perpetuating influence. Much as the increasingly large childprotection bureaucracy has been held safe from political challenge amid
decreasing abuse rates, the administrative structure of registration and
notification can be expected to resist retrenchment efforts. 25 3 Equally
important, private industry-such as that providing data mining and
notification services-also can be expected to press for maintenance of
the political status quo.25 4 In short, again drawing from social science
literature on lock-in, we see an endowment effect operative, whereby
those who benefit from maintenance of the status quo will defend it,
even if policy change would yield greater overall social benefit.255
Even more fundamentally, there is little reason to think that
principled objection to the laws, not uncommonly voiced up through the
1980s, will resurface. In 1941, in the shadow of totalitarian oppression
abroad, the United States Supreme Court cautioned in Hines v.
Davidowitz that "champions of freedom for the individual have always
vigorously opposed burdensome registration systems," and noted
historic opposition to requirements "at war with the fundamental

252. Indeed, the skewed public fear over strangers is in some sense justified by
evidence suggesting that as a class stranger-assailants cause more severe physical harm and
death to their victims than non-strangers. MICHELE L. MELOY, SEX OFFENSES AND THE MEN
WHO COMMIT THEM: AN ASSESSMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS ON PROBATION 22 (2006). Other
research, however, points to the especially harmful effects of violent victimization by
familiars. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and
Friends,85 WASH. U. L. REv. 343 (2007).
253. JENKINS, supra note 147, at 232-33.
254. For just two of the myriad entities offering web-based information on registrants,
see NAT'L ALERT REGISTRY, http://www.registeredoffenderslist.org/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2011); FAMILY WATCHDOG, http://www.familywatchdog.us (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
255. On the endowment effect more generally, see Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo
Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 608, 625-30 (1998).
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principles of our free government, in that they would bring about
unnecessary and irritating restrictions upon personal liberties of the
individual ..
. ,256 Today, with the Supreme Court having
constitutionally condoned onerous registration requirements and
notification conditions, and the laws enjoying broad public support, the
Court's words seem a quaint reminder of a distant past.2 57
Perhaps some future use of registration and notification by a
foreign government, an antagonist of the United States, will reawaken
and stir political sensibilities against such laws. If this were to occur,
however, such a reaction very likely would not be directed against
registration, which has become an accepted method of social control,
endorsed by such institutions as the New York Times. 258 Whether some
outgrowth or application of community notification, neither known nor
imagined today, turns public sentiment against notification remains to
be seen. However, given that the public has gone unperturbed by its
negative byproducts to date makes such a reaction doubtful.
CONCLUSION

In all, there is strong reason to believe that registration and
notification laws are here to stay. Like the massive increases in
imprisonment they accompanied in the 1990s, the laws are the product
of a significant social and political transformation. However, recent
state efforts to curb their massive prison populations (mainly due to cost
concerns, not principle) will not likely be paralleled by a decrease in
registration and notification. Indeed, given that the social control
method promises continued monitoring of the criminally convicted on
the relative cheap-when prison populations can no longer be
sustained-makes the likelihood of their sustainment all the greater.
The added potential of registration and notification dovetailing with
recent "techno-correction" strategies, such as global positioning
systems 259 and sub-dermal "chips ' '260 that allow for real-time tracking of
256. 312 U.S. 52, 70-71 (1941).
257. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103-06 (2003) (demining registration and
notification non-punitive in character and hence permissible under Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy clauses); Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2003)
(denying procedural due process challenge to registration and community notification).
258. See Editorial, Fine-Tuning Megan's Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A16.
259. See Wendy Koch, More Sex Offenders Tracked by Satellite, USA TODAY, June 7,
2006, at A3.
260. See Isaac B. Rosenberg, Involuntary Endogenous RFID Compliance Monitoring
as a Condition of Federal Supervised Release-Chips Ahoy?, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 331
(2008). Today, RFID can only monitor individuals physically situated within several feet of
radio receivers, and can merely note their presence in a specified location. Id. at 340. But
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registrants makes this all the more likely. That these developments have
occurred, and are occurring, in a period of actual decreasing reported
sexual victimization remains a paradox. 261 For reasons discussed,
however, the situation will not likely change any time soon.

as the technology becomes more sophisticated, its appeal will doubtless grow. Registrants
themselves might see its appeal, as compared to GPS monitoring, which is visually and
physically more obtrusive.
261. See Robert Anglen, Arrests for Sex Crimes Falling, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 23,
2007, at Al; see also DAVID FINKELHOR & LISA M. JONES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINE IN

CHILD SEXUAL

ABUSE CASES

(2004),

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/199298.pdf

(noting decease in child sexual abuse of 50% during 1991-2004); Crime in the United
States, 2006, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/index.html

visited Feb. 6, 2011).
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